Parrhêsia, Free Speech, and Self-Censorship
Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis
Jocasta: What is hard for exiles?
Polynices: One thing is biggest: he has no parrhêsia.
Jocasta: Not saying what you think, that's typical of a slave.
Jocasta: That is painful, being foolish with the foolish.
Polynices: For the sake of gain you have to be a slave against your nature.
—Euripides, Phoenician Women
In this brief exchange between a mother and her exiled son, Euripides has Jocasta and Polynices discuss the place of parrhêsia
in fifth-century Athenian thinking. First, parrhêsia
is the property of a free citizen: it characterizes a man who is free (i.e., he is not a slave) and who participates in the affairs of his native city (i.e., he is not an exile). Second, parrhêsia
is defined not as "free speech" as commonly understood in the twenty-first century, as a universal human right, but as "frank speech," the ability to "say what you think." In the view of Jocasta and Polynices, slaves and exiles must hide their true thoughts. The tension between "frank speech," typical of the ideal free citizen, and the art of "veiled speech," that is, the methods of expression adopted by the less-than-free, is this book's central theme.
This opening chapter both sets out the broader conceptual framework we use for this collection and clarifies the ways in which subsequent chapters share this common theme of veiled speech and self-censorship. One point in need of clarification is why we focus on veiled speech as a form of subversion. Another is what the common thread is in the selection of authors ranging "from Aristophanes to Hobbes," despite their chronological spread and range of different historical and literary contexts.
We have taken a broad sweep at the evidence because censorship is a phenomenon that seems to have no temporal or geographical boundaries: it characterizes both totalitarian dictatorships and liberal democracies from ancient Athens to the twentieth century and is still with us in the twenty-first. While the centralized forms of censorship practiced in countries like China and Iran are notorious, we should not forget that even states with a constitutional commitment to freedom of speech impose limits on that freedom; nowhere is the right absolute. And this is not by any means a bad thing. How to balance the right to free speech against other legitimate concerns is a perennial issue. The most extreme form of free speech is no doubt frank speech, parrhêsia, which etymologically originates in pan ("everything") and rhêsia ("speaking"): in other words, the freedom to "say all." But it will be obvious that in practice this is hardly ever possible. Cultural and social conventions impose limits on what we can say, whether in interactions between private persons (family, friends, colleagues) or in the public sphere between individuals and the state. In general terms, censorship can be defined as the regulation of a person's political and moral expression by the imposition of limits on the free circulation of ideas, images, and information. All democratic states recognize that there is an inherent tension between the individual's right to free speech and the public's interest in such matters as privacy, security, the administration of justice, and the protection of community standards.
The collection's chronological spread of essays was chosen to cover a number of flashpoints in classical and later periods, ending just before the modern age when the concept was about to change (BCE: fifth, fourth to third, and first centuries; CE: first, second, fourth to sixth, seventh, thirteenth, sixteenth to seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries). It should be kept in mind that the selection is also in part a result of the availability of good material, especially in periods when the tension around free speech (and attempts to control it) intensified, as for instance in imperial Rome or the Christian era. Furthermore, the essays cover not only different literary genres (that is, poetic texts as well as historical, epistolary, and philosophical prose) and many periods in history, but also many modes of expression (the collection is "multimodal" in that it makes use of examples from oral culture and theater, written sources, and images to illustrate the persistent presence of self-regulating measures by writers and creative artists of a variety of works).
These three aspects of the topic under scrutiny (diversity in chronology, theme, and medium) raise another issue regarding the theoretical framework of this collection. These considerations about the ubiquity of self-censorship not only help to illustrate that this is a perennial problem, but also help to define self-regulation as a social and cultural phenomenon. While traditional treatments tend to position the discourse on censorship solely within the political environment, there is as yet little debate on self-regulation in antiquity. In other words, these essays are taking the first steps to study this aspect based on carefully selected samples, and the volume as a whole puts forward a number of claims that we hope will change the focus and widen the scope regarding the debate on parrhêsia and the limits different groups choose to impose on it.
While it would go too far to claim that our investigations will produce a "theory" of self-censorship, the chapters clearly emphasize the many ways in which the (potentially) oppressed respond to the threat of controlling authorities. As a result a picture emerges that throws light on the dynamics of the subtle subversion in different kinds of context. By carefully defining the core terms such as parrhêsia, libertas, and (self-)censorship, we aim to ensure that our perspective is built on clear principles and distinctive from the standard one, in which the censoring party is often central and regularly subjected to a modern (negative) judgment.
The evidence also justifies the importance of antiquity—which is why the weight of chapters leans toward classical and late antique/medieval times. The inclusion of two chapters relating to the early modern period puts us in a position to add a further dimension to the discussion (the religious censure of images), and to sketch the views of a theorist about self-censorship based on his own experience (suppression of his work). Combined, the chapters show how the concrete situations that are analyzed underscore the social origin of subversion and censorship. Thus each chapter shores up the broader thesis we articulate. We hope that this will eventually allow for a theoretical framework that clarifies the dynamics between "oppressors" and "the oppressed," even if (1) we use these terms not just in a political sense, (2) we privilege the perspective of the oppressed (and those under the threat of oppression), and (3) we allow for some gaps in coverage—it is impossible to cover all historical periods in one volume—but offer a considered selection of cases. Some of the thematic links and common threads of the essays will be highlighted in the epilogue.
In terms of its more specific objectives, the volume aims to show, first, that limitations on free speech have prompted creative responses that often require subtle and sophisticated decoding; second, that the tension between "frank speech" and the art of veiled speech is the result of a wider human need for expressing opinions—one that unavoidably leads to disagreement and dispute; and third, that examination of such an omnipresent theme across different historical periods is possible, provided that we use a cautious and evenhanded method of analysis in order to avoid projecting modern notions of free speech onto the evidence. These three objectives are intended to serve the broader objective we have set ourselves, namely to approach the theme of subversion and censorship "from below" (bottom-up) instead of the more common "from above" (top-down) perspective. The resulting diachronic and cross-cultural vista on the dynamics of censorship will begin to give us a more fine-grained understanding of the creative choices made by those who felt limited in their expression of views and were forced to "self-regulate" in some form or other, whether they attempted to evade political, cultural, religious, or social restrictions.
Censorship and Veiled Speech in Antiquity
It is a remarkable fact that in the last decade of the sixth century BCE (at least as dated by tradition) political revolutions took place in two of the most important cities of the ancient Mediterranean world, revolutions that led to the centrality of the concept of free speech in contemporary (and not just Western) political discourse, for this was the decade that saw the introduction of democratic reforms associated with Cleisthenes in Athens and the overthrow of monarchy at Rome and the creation of the Roman Republic. But if these societies gave birth to "free" or "frank" speech (parrhêsia, libertas), they also began the exploration of the limits of free speech, for it is too often ignored that the history of censorship in the West has its origins in ancient Greece and Rome. Some writers (e.g., Coetzee 1996) assume that systematic censorship was brought into being by the invention of printing, because it centralized the process of publication and so enabled governments to impose greater controls. By contrast, in scribal cultures, like those of classical antiquity and the European Middle Ages, where books and ideas were disseminated by handwritten copies, the power of publication was widely dispersed. As a result the situation that faces us today is very similar to that before the invention of printing: on the Internet thoughts and ideas can be published without the kinds of controls traditionally exerted by governments and great publishing houses. Yet the problems arising from regimes under authoritarian leaders are of all ages; dissent and censorship were as widespread in antiquity as they are today. Athens and Rome provide examples of pretechnological societies in which issues of freedom of thought and speech were, nevertheless, of pressing concern. Similar to many other periods in history, they provide two contexts in which freedom of speech was acknowledged as the "right" of every citizen. Both societies experienced difficulties in clearly defining and defending these "rights," in particular when political circumstances changed so that the right to freedom of speech became more precarious and more dangerous for its practitioners (e.g., imperial Rome as authoritarian state). We pursue the theme into the Christian and early modern eras because doing so allows us to shift focus from contexts driven by social and political concerns to one determined by a religious ideology.
Existing work on censorship and subversion in antiquity is quickly summarized, since it is either absent or piecemeal. Very little work has been done that assists in charting and analyzing the kind of subversive strategies we have assembled here under the common heading "veiled speech." In other words, a full and comprehensive study for the important periods of classical Greece (fifth and fourth centuries) and republican and imperial Rome is still to be written. This volume takes a first step in that direction. The evolution of the struggle between arbitrary suppression and free speech in classical and medieval times offers a fascinating dossier of untapped stories on power abuse, intellectual courage, and subversive action.
The scholarship on these conflicts over political and moral ideas between rulers and their subjects from the specific angle of self-censorship is clearly limited and of variable scope. After the two useful (but incomplete) surveys on book burning (Forbes 1936; Cramer 1945) and the pioneering article by Ahl (1984), little was published in English with a clear focus on censorship or free speech in antiquity until Sluiter and Rosen (2004) and Konstan (2012). A recent surge in historical surveys on book destruction has not really filled that void. Book burning is only one strategy of oppressive regimes, but more often than not the analysis on ancient sources is too much dominated by twentieth-century events, in particular the famous 1933 book burning in Berlin organized by students—half-heartedly endorsed, but not led by, the National Socialists. The images of books on a pyre have haunted the discussion ever since. Of course this was an iconic event, but there are very few parallels for this kind of systematic destruction of the physical carriers of intellectual capital associated with one particular group. Book burning is a recurrent and much used method to settle disputes over issues of intellectual or religious importance: often "the book is the double of the man, and burning it is the equivalent of killing him." But modern treatments of book destruction suffer from an overly narrow approach, apart from having other flaws (Báez 2008 is unsatisfactory in terms of analysis; Bosmajian 2006 does not cover antiquity sufficiently). We grant that Bosmajian offers a useful model to categorize cases of book burning: heresy, obscenity, or sedition. His scheme basically covers the most important areas (religious, moral, political), but still leaves room for improvement, given that these are the more traditional categories used in scholarship on the subject.
In ancient Greece the notion of frank speech (parrhêsia) was both political and social. We find it in the context of the city assembly, but also in historical and philosophical writings. Intellectuals interacting with men in power had to know their place or they might suffer from it. One helpful example is what happened to Callisthenes, Aristotle's cousin: when introduced at the court of Alexander, he "did not take his own advice" and spoke "with too much freedom to the king" (parrhesiastikoteron lalounta D.L. 5.4-5), upon which Aristotle allegedly remarked that he would "be short-lived by what he said" (ibid.). Callisthenes died miserably after a period of isolated imprisonment. The incident even made Aristotle unwelcome at the court. Not only does this anecdote reveal the sensitive nature of the relationship between a monarch and his entourage, but it also illustrates that those close to the king were aware of the need for tact and social agility.
Among orators and ancient historians "frank speech" was also a much-used element in their work. We know of the sometimes rowdy circumstances in assemblies, in which the shouting and protesting could be used to subdue a speaker into silence. Comments on the proper task of a historian and the right method reflect great self-awareness of the genre and its role. Lucian offers an interesting judgment on this issue in his On How to Write History (Hist. conscr. 59): "eulogy and censure should be careful and considered, free from slander, supported by evidence, cursory and relevant to the occasion for those involved are not in court; otherwise you will be censured just like Theopompus who made a business of impeaching everyone in a quarrelsome spirit, acting as a prosecutor rather than a recorder of events." It was quite common to use "robust" language in historical writings: Theopompus the historian was famously condemned by Polybius for his abusive account of Philip of Macedon. Yet Dionysius of Halicarnassus "defended Theopompus' attack against Polybius criticism as a praiseworthy example of parrhêsia" (Walbank 1962, 2). In this assessment Walbank does not expand on the meaning of the term, but both its etymology and the context suggest that we can interpret it as frank speech, or more literally, "speaking without reservations." Dionysus clearly believed that Theopompus was right to speak freely and not hold back. Behind such a view is not the idea of a legal right to speak freely, but rather the fact that there was no impediment to doing so. Dionysus also disagreed with Polybius's reasons, which concern the appropriate use of the genre (historical biography). The example shows that ancient authors did not always discuss these matters from an ethical point of view or even with a concern about etiquette.
What all three examples show is that censorship in its broadest possible meaning is part of a continuous debate about boundaries within different spheres of human interaction: in these cases it concerns debate about (sometimes implicit) rules of social interaction or conventions of a literary genre. On a grander scale a whole society will be in the business of determining what its boundaries are—ethically, politically, and culturally. This is why we can speak of self-regulation or self-censorship. It is a core component of human behavior playing a role in the private and public spheres, and expanding in ever widening circles of human interaction. Individuals form groups, and sociologists and anthropologists refer to the outcomes of the process that includes or excludes others from a group as "in-groups" and "out-groups." These terms convey the central notions underpinning our use of censorship in a broad sense: it refers to the mechanism of social groups, which have implicit or explicit "rules" about whom the core members will admit into their midst.
Clearly this is not the meaning that people normally attach to the word "censorship." In the twentieth century the term became a byword for the excessive use of power by evil regimes and is closely associated with fascism and communism. That use of the term makes it almost exclusively political. In this study we want to emphasize the strong social dimension attached to the notion of selecting one view over another; when this leads to suppressing a view by forceful means it is one mode of censorship, played out in the political arena. In short, we consider the social dimension as more important than the political one.
One further study should be mentioned in this context. In her book Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, Arlene Saxonhouse offers an original and insightful analysis of parrhêsia. Her perspective emphasizes the break from the Homeric age characterized by shame and deference. The loss of shame would lead to the "shameless [and shaming] speech" of Socrates and introduce a new paradigm in Athenian society. What we can learn from this approach is how the annulment of the cohesive power of shame (a social constraint) triggered a new political discourse of "fearless speech." In its most extreme form Athenian democracy represents a radical stance to political participation, without the aristocratic limits, but with the liberties of speaking freely. This is the reason why Saxonhouse defines parrhêsia as "the democratic practice of shamelessness."
Précis of the Volume
In this book we have brought together experts in a deliberately diverse range of areas. Together they explore the creative strategies to get around the threat of censorship and illustrate how such approaches to self-expression and self-regulation are of all times. The diachronic arrangement supports the broader argument that aims to illustrate the ubiquity of subtle subversion. At the same time there is a thematic coherence in the analyses of these chapters that also reinforces the chronological progression.
In Athens, the city in the classical world that we most closely associate with freedom of expression, parrhêsia was not without its complexities and limitations. After all, this is the city that executed Socrates. But it will not do to focus on one infamous case, because this outcome was determined not only by attitudes toward, and views about, the limits of free speech, but also by the peculiar historical circumstances and the long buildup of Socrates' life and practice—that is, if we can trust Plato's account of these. It will be useful to explore both the conceptual and historical aspects of the issue at hand in order to understand fully what was (and is) at stake, when we try to ascertain the dynamics of censorship.
One reason for Athens's reputation for parrhêsia is that it was here that comedy, a form of drama centrally concerned with mocking the follies and foibles of the city's politicians, was invented and first flourished. Boundaries were imposed, however, even upon this famously free space. For this reason Chapter 2 begins by exploring the limitations imposed upon comic playwrights in classical Athens and the extent to which dramatists like Aristophanes and Eupolis practiced self-censorship in order to protect themselves from prosecution. While rejecting the possibility of censorship by the archons, Andrew Hartwig finds that certain intellectual positions were likely to attract legal action (denial of the existence of the gods, for example) and that greater freedom of political comment was allowed at the Lenaia, a festival with a primarily local audience, than at the City Dionysia, which attracted foreign spectators as well.
Chapter 3 takes up the issue of parrhêsia and self-censorship in classical Athens again, but in a different cultural and political context, that of the symposium. Lara O'Sullivan argues that while parrhêsia and isêgoria (equality of access to speech) were viewed as characteristic of Athenian democracy, "parrhêsia also had a place in the private domain of the symposium." O'Sullivan argues for parallelism between the public and private spheres, contending that the few restrictions upon freedom of speech in the dêmos also applied in the symposium (i.e., that participants in a symposium practiced self-censorship), because unfettered freedom had the potential for producing civil discord. She concludes that the restrictions applicable in the symposium mirror not only those found in the dêmos, but also those characteristic of the comic stage.
Chapter 4 explores the case of one of classical Athens's more extreme exponents of parrhêsia, Diogenes the Cynic, and poses a provocative question: why did he not suffer the same fate as Socrates? Central to this discussion is the concept of tolerance, for despite his eccentricity Diogenes was tolerated, even loved, by the Athenians. Han Baltussen is concerned to examine the boundaries of social tolerance applicable not to an institution, such as comedy or the symposium, but to an extreme individual who chose to reject conventional values in the most public way possible and did not get suppressed for it. His analysis teases out new insights from the responses by Diogenes' audience recorded in ancient sources, and makes use of modern sociological perspectives on in-groups and out-groups.
When we turn to the Romans, we discover that the Latin language has no precise equivalent for the Greek parrhêsia. It does not follow, however, that Romans did not value the ability to employ "frank speech." Libertas, "freedom," covered the same semantic ground as the Greek eleutheria and parrhêsia combined, for it included both "the civil status of a free man" (OLD §1) and "frankness of speech" (OLD §7). Similarly, the cognate adjective liber meant both "possessing the social and legal status of a free man" (OLD §1) and "open, frank, candid" (OLD §11). And if writers wished to make it clear that they were referring specifically to free or frank speech as opposed to freedom in general, they could, like speakers of English, resort to such periphrases as oratio libera ("free/frank speech"), Quintilian's preferred translation of parrhêsia (9.2.27). And so we should not be surprised if a writer like Cicero prizes the ability to speak his thoughts freely (e.g., Phil. 3.5.9, 3.37.2, Brut. 256.6, Fam. 10.5.3, Att. 14.14.2). It is also worth noting that Cicero, like the Euripidean Jocasta and Polynices, considers it slavish to accept restrictions upon free speech: "'It is tyranny to speak against anyone you want and to defend anyone you want.' No, it is slavery not to speak against anyone you want and not to defend anyone you want" (Sull. 48).
As in Athens, the theater in republican Rome was a place for contesting the limits of speech. In Chapter 5 Gesine Manuwald argues that there was "no complete freedom for the content and tone of dramas." She contends that while there were no laws governing what could be said on stage, the Romans viewed the stage as an inappropriate place for comments on an individual's conduct because of the medium's one-sidedness. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence to suggest, first, that playwrights did engage with contemporary moral and political issues; second, that dramatic performances became increasingly politicized in the last century of the republic and in the early imperial period; and third, that although there was no formal censorship in the first century CE, there was "control of literature by 'the powerful' . . . who might interfere if they suspected anything subversive in literary works."
While the ability to speak one's thoughts frankly was still prized in the early empire (e.g., Tac. Hist. 1.1.20), the opportunities for free expression were far more restricted, primarily because of Augustus's extension of the law on treason to cover words as well as deeds (Tac. Ann. 1.72). Ovid's banishment to Tomis in 8 CE is only the best known attempt to control free expression under the principate. And Augustus was not the only culprit. Writers continued to be exiled or executed and their books destroyed under the Julio-Claudian and Flavian emperors (e.g., Tac. Ann. 4.34-35, Suet. Dom. 10). Parrhêsia became impossible, veiled speech a necessity.
In Chapter 6 we have the first of three case studies of individual writers attempting to negotiate these new, more restrictive conditions. Ioannis Ziogas takes up the examples of Virgil and Ovid, poets who compete with the emperor "to shape artistic creation, define its meaning, and make it known to the Roman world." Thus the author (auctor) of the Aeneid was unable to compete with the author of the principate when he wished to practice self-censorship and have his poem destroyed. Rather the poem was preserved, as the Life of Virgil has it, auctore Augusto, and so became, Ovid claimed, Augustus's own poem. Ovid, by contrast, claims that he himself tried to destroy Metamorphoses, but that the work survived. This act of self-censorship also failed, thus proving the claim at the end of book 15 that fire could not destroy the poet's work.
Seneca, a figure central to the history of both politics and philosophy under the early principate, is the focus of Chapter 7. Hence it is appropriate that Marcus Wilson both examines growing political censorship under the Julio-Claudians and places Seneca's conspicuous silence about politics in the Moral Epistles within the context of late Neronian Rome. He pays particular attention to Seneca's philosophical eclecticism (most notably his frequent references to the Epicurean ideal of withdrawal from public life) and concludes that Seneca faced a "censorship regime that necessitated philosophical eclecticism on pain of death."
Chapter 8 brings us to the Flavians and the Argonautica of Valerius Flaccus. The most prestigious of all literary genres in Rome, epic was a primary vehicle for reflection upon Roman power and identity and so an object of imperial scrutiny since Augustus and "his" Aeneid. Even under Vespasian, an emperor famous for his leniency, the practice of parrhêsia could lead to execution. Peter J. Davis argues that Valerius, in writing mythological epic, attempted "a strategy of complex indirection," a strategy that allowed reflection on contemporary issues such as the Roman propensity to civil war and the problems posed by the principate for the display of aristocratic uirtus. For Valerius Flaccus "indirection was the safest way of avoiding censorship."
Chapter 9 takes a different approach, offering an overview not of an author but of literature under the reigns of Nerva and Trajan, an era that, at least at first, proclaimed "liberty" as its watchword. For John Penwill the key to understanding the literature of this era (most notably Martial, Juvenal, Tacitus, and Pliny) is its emphasis on the temporary nature of the freedom offered, its awareness of freedom's dependence on the character of the princeps, and its concentration on methods of expressing political dissent.
From the Roman Empire at the height of its power we move to the Christian world of late antiquity and beyond. The rise of the church introduced a new field for censorship, because ecclesiastical authorities, both Catholic and Orthodox, were concerned to enforce theological conformity through the suppression of variant forms of Christian belief which they labeled "heresy." In the late antique, medieval, and early modern worlds, rulers of both church and state were no less anxious than some emperors of the first and second centuries to prevent the communication of ideas of which they disapproved. Particularly striking is the fact that although the religion had changed, responses to suppressing freedom of thought and expression did not.
In Chapter 10 Pauline Allen takes up the case of Christian letter-writers in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries and the means they adopted in order to circumvent various forms of civil and ecclesiastical censorship. She underlines the importance of self-censorship as a means of avoiding exile or prosecution for treason and of the careful selection of diplomatic letter-bearers, who might well carry an oral message to accompany the written letter, and whose instructions commonly insisted upon secrecy and veiled speech.
The concept of heresy is central to Chapter 11, for that was one of the charges laid in the 640s by censors against those who resisted the Byzantine emperor's attempted suppression of debate on the nature of Jesus Christ. Bronwen Neil focuses on the cases of Maximus, who failed to practice self-censorship, openly comparing his accusers to heretics of previous times, and so suffered flogging as well as the amputation of his tongue and right hand, and Pope Martin, whose letters from exile (his death sentence was commuted) constitute clear examples of self-censorship, since he refrains from naming both his persecutors and his addressees.
Chapter 12 also considers attempts to suppress heresy, this time in thirteenth-century France. The massive and detailed records produced by the inquisitors enable Megan Cassidy-Welch to explore the responses not of senior churchmen to accusations of heresy (as in Chapter 11), but of ordinary inhabitants of the Languedoc. She finds that the accused adopted a variety of strategies of self-censorship before the tribunal: claims that they could not remember, that they had no knowledge, or that remarks were made in jest. Outside the tribunal inquisitors met other forms of resistance: the destruction of inquisitorial records, violent protest. and even murder.
Chapter 13 takes up the questions of heresy and self-censorship in the context of the visual arts in early modern Spain, where the Inquisition, enforcing rules laid down by the Council of Trent (concluded 1563), insisted on the policing of images in churches. François Soyer notes that artists themselves practiced self-censorship, with some publishing guidelines for the appropriate treatment of religious subjects, and presents three case studies in which clergymen denounced works of art to the Inquisition in order to prevent the propagation of heresy before it occurred. In these cases self-censorship was the product not of resistance, as in the Languedoc, but of fear of inquisitorial prosecution.
Chapter 14 closes the volume appropriately enough with an essay on Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher who both practiced self-censorship and reflected upon it. Jonathan Parkin argues that Hobbes concealed his own political, religious, and scientific views for the sake of self-preservation and made self-censorship a centerpiece of his political theory, one task of the sovereign in Leviathan being to limit individuals to expressions of thought and belief that did not endanger social cohesion. In the context of the present volume, it is striking that Hobbes's views coincide exactly with those of the ancient Athenians examined in Chapters 2-4, for they too viewed unfettered freedom of expression as likely to produce civil discord.
To sum up, the volume places the notions of parrhêsia and self-regulation (expressed as veiled speech or self-censorship) at its core, while the individual topics and texts should be seen as a carefully selected set of case studies. Combined, the chapters attempt to bring out the common features of oral and written reports that reflect the interaction between individual points of view as well as conventional views within certain communities of various sizes: since the authors were not in a position to "speak frankly," they chose ways to speak less frankly, but speak nonetheless. This form of self-regulation becomes self-censorship, in particular in the public sphere. Thus "frank speech" may mean different things in different contexts, but it hardly means a right; rather we may call it a "privilege" or "entitlement" arising from a particular situation.
The historical progression reflected in the chapters is intended to show how the dynamic between an oppressive social or political framework and creative attempts to subvert such a framework is present in all historical periods under examination. During Athenian democracy, in imperial Rome, during the Christian era, and beyond, human beings attempted to speak up, and the use of veiled speech frequently gave them a chance to do so with impunity.